i
Index for advertisers j Index for users n Number of advertisers p i Probability that advertiser i's most targeted user clicks on his advertisement x ij Distance between advertiser i and user j along the circle γ
Decay factor, which also measures the heterogeneity of users' preferences q ij Decay in the probability that user j clicks on advertiser i v i Unit value that advertiser i derives from each click z i Advertiser i's reference value, defined as z i = v i p i z (i) The i th highest value among all z i π T The publisher's revenue under traditional advertising π B
The publisher's revenue under behavioral targeting x i
Marginal user for allocation under behavioral targeting who has the same value to advertisers i and i + 1 y i
Marginal user for payment under behavioral targeting who has the same value to advertisers i -1 and i + 1 Δ i Cross-border effect under behavioral targeting H i Advertiser i's expected payment for the users won under behavioral targeting A i Advertiser i's payoff under behavioral targeting
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We consider any advertiser i's bidding strategy b i . We suppose that among the rest of advertisers, advertiser l has the highest proposed expected payment b l @ p l E [q] . If b i @ p i E[q] > b l @ p l E[q], advertiser i wins the auction with total expected payment b l p l E[q], and his payoff is
Otherwise, the advertiser loses the auction and his payoff is zero.
We first consider bidding
, the advertiser wins the auction and derives the payoff in Equation (16), just as if
, the advertiser loses the auction and derives zero payoff, just as if bidding
, bidding b i causes the advertiser to lose the auction and receive zero payoff, whereas if he had bid v i , the advertiser would have won the auction and derived positive payoff as in Equation (16). Therefore, bidding b i < v i is (weakly) dominated by bidding v i .
We then consider bidding
, the advertiser loses the auction and derives zero payoff, just as if bidding v i .
, bidding b i causes the advertiser to win the auction with negative payoff, whereas bidding v i leads to zero payoff. Therefore, bidding b i > v i is (weakly) dominated by bidding v i . All together, bidding true value v i is advertiser i's (weakly) dominant strategy.
Under behavioral targeting, the same argument applies, simply replacing p i E[q] with p i q ij for user j.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For any advertiser k different from advertisers i and i + 1, we first consider the case where the shortest path from user j (located between advertiser i and i + 1) to advertiser k passes advertiser i.
where the first inequality follows from the comparable value assumption and the second inequality is because z i < z k . Therefore, in this case, advertiser i derives higher value than advertiser k from user j. Similarly, when the shortest path from user j to advertiser k passes advertiser i + 1, advertiser i + 1 derives higher value than advertiser k from user j. All together, either advertiser i or advertiser i + 1 derives higher value than any other advertiser k from user j, and thus user j must be assigned to either advertiser i or advertiser i + 1 in equilibrium.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We denote V ij / z i q ij , the value that the advertiser i derives from user j, and denote V (1)j and V (2)j as the highest and second highest values
(2)j > V (2)j . In addition, for the additional users that advertiser i wins under z ' i , the highest values under z i become the second highest ones under z ' i , and thus V ' (2)j = V (1)j > V (2)j . Because the publisher's revenue is the sum of the second highest value from each user, π ' B > π B .
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (a) By Lemma 3, Mπ B /Mz i > 0. Given z (2) and the order constraint z (i) > z (i+1), , to maximize π B , z (3) = z (4) = … = z (n) = z (2) . For z (1) , we have Mπ B /Mz (1) > 0 subject to (i.e., the comparable value assumption). Noticing z (n) = z (2) , we conclude the z (1) that maximizes π B is
(when the condition binds).
(b) Similarly, because Mπ B /Mz i > 0, to minimize π B subject to z (2) and z (i) > z (i+1) , we have z (1) = z (2) and z (3) = z (4) = … = z (n) . Because of the comparable value assumption , the z (n) that minimizes π B is .
We next determine how the relative location of the two advertisers with z (2) affects the revenue. When n = 2 or 3, there is a unique relative distribution of these advertisers' values. We next focus on the case with n > 4.
We first examine the possible revenue for a user segment i | (i + 1). For a user segment with z i = z (2) and z i+1 = z (2) , or for user segment z (2) | z (2) , the revenue is from a base payment (in Table A1 ) by Equation (7) with . For user segment z (2) | z (n) , if z (2) 's other neighbor is of z (n) , the
revenue is from a base payment (in Table A1 ) by Equation (7) with x i = 1/n; if z (2) 's other neighbor is of z (2) , the revenue is the base payment plus the cross-border effect. By Equation (10), the cross-border effect is
For user segment z (n) | z (n) , if the neighbors are of z (n) , the revenue is from a base payment (in Table A1 ) by Equation (7) with x i = 1/(2n); if one neighbor is of z (2) and the other is of z (n) , the revenue is the base payment plus one piece of the cross-border effect defined in (17). If both neighbors are of z (2) , the revenue is the base payment plus two pieces of the cross-border effect (with one piece at each border).
Table A1. The Base Payments for Possible User Segments
User Segment
Notice the base payment from each user segment i | (i + 1) is solely determined by the values z i and z i+1 (while the cross-border effect depends on the neighbors' values). Therefore, the revenue from base payments (excluding the cross-border effect) can differ only when the two highestvalue advertisers are adjacent and when they are not. In the former, the revenue consists revenue from one z (2) | z (2) segment, from two z (2) | z (n) segments, and from (n -3) z (n) | z (n) segments; in the latter (the non-adjacent case), the revenue consists of revenue from four z (2) | z (n) segments and from (n -4) z (n) | z (n) segments. The difference in these revenues is the revenue from one z (2) | z (2) and from one z (n) | z (n) minus the revenue from two z (2) | z (n) ; that is, 1 1 3 4 1 1 1 3 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 4 1 1 1 4 1 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 n n z n n n z n n n z n n z n n n z n n n z
which indicates that the revenue from base payments is greater when the highest-value advertisers are adjacent.
If the two highest-value advertisers are adjacent, the total revenue includes four pieces of cross-border effects, in addition to the revenue from the base payment. When n = 4, the four pieces consist of two from the two z (2) | z (n) segments (because in each segment z (2) neighbors the other z (2) ) and two from the z (n) | z (n) segment (because both z (n) 's neighbor z (2) ). When n > 5, the four pieces consist of two from the two z (2) | z (n) segments and two from the two z (n) | z (n) segments with one z (n) in each segment neighbored by z (2) .
If the two highest-value advertisers are not adjacent, the total revenue contains no cross-border effect when n = 4. Therefore, the total revenue (including the revenue from the base payment and the cross-border effect) is lower when the two highest-value advertisers are not adjacent than when they are. When n > 5, if the two highest-value advertisers are 2/n distant to each other (i.e., there is one lowest-value advertiser in between), the total revenue contains two pieces of cross-border effect: either from the two z (n) | z (n) segments with one z (n) neighbored by z (2) (if n > 5) or from the z (n) | z (n) segment with both z (n) 's neighbored by z (2) (if n = 5). If at least two lowest-value advertisers are located between the two highest-value advertisers, the total revenue contains four pieces of cross-border effect. The reason is that, around each arc connecting the two z (2) 's, we should have either two z (n) | z (n) segments with one z (n) neighbored by z (2) in each segment or one z (n) | z (n) segment with both z (n) 's neighbored by z (2) . Either case leads to two pieces of cross-border effect with one arc, and we have two different arcs. Therefore, when n > 5, the structure with the two highest-value advertisers being 2/n distant from each other generates the least total revenue (with the lowest revenue from the base payment and the least number of cross-border effects).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (a) When n = 2, by Proposition 1, given z (2) , the structure with z (1) = z (2) /(1 -γ/2) generates the highest π B , in which the dominant advertiser wins all users (except the other advertiser's most targeted user, from which both advertisers derive the same value). In this case, by Equation (7) with x i = 1/2, , which is the same as π T by Equation (3). Therefore, π B < π T , and the equality occurs only if z (1) π γ
When n > 3, π B > π T is always possible. For example, when z (1) = z (2) = … z (n) , π B consists of the base payments from the n z (2) | z (2) segments.
According to Table A1, . Noticing , we can conclude π B > π T when n > 3. Furthermore, a value structure π γ
with z (1) > z (2) results in a higher revenue under behavioral targeting (by Lemma 3) and in the same revenue under traditional advertising, which leads to π B > π T .
(b) For 2 < n < 6, traditional advertising might generate higher revenue than behavioral targeting as well. For n = 5, see the proof in part (c).
When n = 4, the least revenue under behavioral advertising is (from four z (2) | z (n) segments), which is less than 1 4 1 8
regardless of γ. When n = 3, the least revenue consists of the base payment (from two z (2) | z (n) segments and one z (2) 
segment) and two pieces of cross-border effect: 
which is less than π T regardless of γ because the term in the square bracket is negative.
(c) When n > 5, according to the proof of Proposition 1, the least revenue consists of the base payment (from four z (2) | z (n) segments and (n -4) z (n) | z (n) segments) and two pieces of cross-border effect:
The difference between this π B and π T in Equation (3) 
γ n n n n n n z n n n n n n z n ( ) (
The term in the second square bracket is increasing in γ by noticing the first-order derivative and thus is greater than its value at zero n²(n -4) -(3n -4)n + 2n = n(n -6)(n -1) (which is nonnegative if n > 6). Therefore, the difference is positive, and behavioral advertising generates higher revenue if n > 6. If n = 5, the difference is negative for any γ by noting that the value of the term in the square bracket at γ = 2 is -3.5. All together, we can conclude that if n < 6, the revenue under behavioral targeting may be less than the revenue under traditional advertising. If n > 6, the least amount of revenue under behavioral targeting is still greater than the revenue under traditional advertising. Therefore, if and only if n > 6, the publisher is better off using behavioral targeting.
A.7 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Under behavioral targeting, by Equation (6). According to Equation (13), by substituting in x i and noting Δ i = 0.
According to Equation (3), . Therefore, when n = 3, π B = π T , and when n > 3, π B > π T . π γ Proof. (a) When n = 2, according to Proposition 2, the publisher is (weakly) better off under traditional advertising. Meanwhile, when the lower-value advertiser gets no market share under behavioral targeting, two advertising strategies could lead to the same revenue for the publisher. Therefore, if n = 2, the maximum gain is zero.
When n > 2, without loss of generality, we let z 1 = z (1) and normalize z (2) = 1. π B is maximized when z (2) = z (3) = … = z (n) = 1 and z n
by Proposition 1. By substituting z (1) and x 1 = 1/n into (14), we can obtain the maximum π B and thus calculate the maximum gain as 
We notice the first-order derivative of the term in the square bracket on the right-hand side of (18) with respect to n, 
which indicates the maximum gain is increasing in n.
We notice the first-order derivative of the right-hand side of (18) with respect to γ, ( ) 
n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n Note that the term in the above square bracket is greater than (2n -γ) 2 + 2(n -γ)(2n -γ) -(4 -γ)nγ = 8n 2 -14nγ + 3γ 2 + nγ 2 , which is positive. Therefore, the above first-order derivative is positive, and the maximum gain is increasing in γ. where the first integral is the expected value net the base payment for the users in segment i | (i + 1), the second integral is the expected value net the base payment for the users in segment (i -1) | i, Δ i is the cross-border effect, and the last equality is because 
1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 0
